

**NOTE OF THE MEETING WITH ONR ON SECURITY RELATED ISSUES, 7<sup>th</sup> FEBRUARY 2023, 13.00 – 14.00 ONLINE.**

*Present:*

|                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
| Cllr David Blackburn   | Leeds City Council (Vice-Chair, NFLA), Chair |
| Cllr Marion Fitzgerald | Allerdale Borough Council                    |
| Cllr Craig Rivett      | East Suffolk Council                         |
| Jonathan Cook          | Copeland Borough Council                     |
| Bethany Rance          | East Suffolk Council                         |
| Naomi Gould            | East Suffolk Council                         |
| Terry Burns            | Essex County Council                         |
| Richard Outram         | Manchester City Council                      |
| Jonathan Holland       | North Wales Regional Planning Service        |
| Jon Zalot              | North Wales Regional Planning Service        |
| Mark Garthwaite        | Somerset County Council                      |
| Carwyn Jones           | Somerset County Council                      |
| Paul Stevens           | Somerset County Council                      |
| Joanna Whitehead       | Somerset County Council                      |
| Simon Hailwood         | South Gloucestershire Council                |
| Philip Matthews        | Nuleaf                                       |
| Catherine Draper       | Nuleaf                                       |

*ONR*

|                |         |
|----------------|---------|
| Dan Hasted     | Speaker |
| Lynne MacKay   |         |
| Cameron Frears |         |
| Kate Stelling  |         |

**1. Welcome and introductions**

1.1 Cllr David Blackburn, in the Chair, welcomed everyone to the meeting, and thanked ONR for agreeing to give this presentation.

**2. Presentation from ONR followed by Q&A**

2.1 The presentation was given by Dan Hasted, Superintending Inspector Nuclear Security. He had worked with ONR for 14 years, covering many aspects of ONR's work. The presentation covered:

- ONR Overview
- International regulatory framework
- Domestic legislative and regulatory framework
- Civil nuclear cyber strategy

- Regulation of cyber security
- Uncrewed aerial systems (drones) at nuclear licensed sites
- The Energy Security Bill and the role of CNC

2.2 The ONR independently regulates nuclear safety, security and safeguards at the UK's 35 nuclear licensed sites. ONR regulates from pre-construction to decommissioning and covers secure transport of nuclear materials as well as health and safety. They have the powers to take enforcement when a duty holder is found to be in breach of regulations. Regulations apply to contractors as well as the nuclear site license holder. The bar for entry to employment with ONR is high, and professional development requirements within the organisation are rigorous.

2.3 There is an international framework of regulations which guides ONR's work. The UK was the first nuclear weapons state to invite inspection by the IAEA, and subsequent follow up inspections. The UK is held in high regard by its international counterparts.

2.4 Whilst the State is responsible for setting national security policy and threat assessment, ONR sets the regulatory approach: inspection, assessment, investigation and enforcement. ONR provides advice to government on regulation, Design Basis Threat (DBT) and response, and works together with government on security vetting of staff (government carries out the background checks, but ONR makes vetting decision for the industry and on Security Assessment Principles).

2.5 The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations (NISR) were published in 2003. They specify what the security plan must cover (nuclear material / other radioactive material, sensitive nuclear information, equipment & software, security contingency measures, workforce trustworthiness, numbers of guards, risks posed to adjacent sites for new build). NISR does not specify or prescribe any arrangements, they are high level and technology neutral so suitable for a diverse and dynamic industry. The arrangements in the security plan must be complied with at all times, and adequacy of the arrangements are judged against the Security Assessment Principles. There is a good, open reporting culture across the nuclear industry.

2.6 The Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) form part of ONR's regulatory framework. They:

- Are published on the internet (except the most sensitive aspects)
- Are outcome-focused, technology and threat-neutral
- Are tiered and modular in nature
- Contain a Unifying Purpose Statement
- Contain 10 Fundamental Security Principles: 1 to 5 are strategic (governance, culture, competence) while 6 to 10 are tactical (physical, personnel, Cyber & response)
- Contain 38 Security Delivery Principles – more granular
- Have 7 Key Security Plan Principles include:
  - Secure by design
  - Threat
  - Graded approach, defence in depth

These are the benchmark against which ONR judges to see if the achieved outcome is achieved, commensurate with the material held at the site. SyAPs are used to review security plans. There are no model standards on which plans are based. Assessment of the plans is by competent security professionals.

2.7 The civil nuclear sector was the first critical national infrastructure in the UK to publicly launch a cyber security strategy in 2017. An updated strategy was published in 2022. UK

government, supported by ONR, undertook a comprehensive cyber security benchmarking study across the sector in 2022.

2.8 ONR's cyber security specialists work closely with other security and safety colleagues to deliver comprehensive and effective regulation. Exercises are carried out, with the support of BEIS. It is important for duty holders to understand the risk and the threats, and to have a spread of tools to prepare for, defend against, identify, respond to and recover from any attack.

2.9 ONR has strong links with the intelligence agencies and, for example, stays up to date on the deployment of drones for malicious purposes. It is a criminal offence to fly in the vicinity of nuclear sites without the permission of the Civil Aviation Authority. The sites have the ability to establish what has been flown near the sites; pilots have been contacted and as a result the number of flights has dropped significantly.

2.10 The Energy Security Bill, which is currently going through parliament, will create an additional statutory function for the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC). This will enable CNC to provide a wider range of policing services in the interests of national security e.g. provide armed guarding service to other facilities that provide services of national importance, or deliver other protective policing services in response to emerging threats. ONR is supportive of the potential broader deployment of CNC. It will provide continued employment opportunities for officers as the AGR stations decommission and before new build stations become active.

The meeting opened up to questions:

2.11 *Q: Are you able to discuss what types of security threats you deal with?*

A: There have been no physical attacks on any nuclear licensed sites. Lawful protests have taken place, but since a change in the law over 15 years ago it is now a criminal offence to trespass on a nuclear licensed site. ONR is engaged with the intelligence agencies. Attempts to breach security through cyber-attacks are on-going. Attackers range from inexpert hackers to hostile nation states. Defence in depth is a key protection principle for both physical and cyber.

2.12 *Comment:* We have dealt with minor incidents at COMAH sites. HSE provide guidance, but do not say what we should be putting in our plans.

*Response:* Finding an acceptable way of dealing with drones is a problem internationally. Jamming is not always possible because drones can fly on pre-programmed flight paths, and there are very tight laws about who can use jamming technology in the UK. CNC have the capability of launching nets which bring drones down, but this is not ideal on a nuclear site as you can't control where they land.

2.13 *Q: We get a lot of questions from the public which we cannot answer without going into detail, which, for security reasons, we cannot. It would help if there was an identified agency which was seen to monitor security, and a list of principles to which we could direct people to demonstrate the steps taken to ensure sites are secure.*

A: The SyAPs document is published, though it is 80 pages long. It does set out how sites are categorized and the penalties for attacking a site. The Chief Nuclear Inspectors reports also provide information.

2.14 *Q: What is ONR's role when it comes to the movement of radioactive waste?*

A: Whilst radioactive material is on site it falls within the site security plan which ONR would have assessed and approved, and with which the site must comply. When the waste leaves the site, it becomes the responsibility of the transporter who would have to be approved. There are lots of checks and balances in place. ONR is not proscriptive and, providing the site and carriers can demonstrate that their actions are secure and they have contingency plans then we will give approval.

Road and rail versus sea. Sometimes there are stakeholders who would prefer us to be prescriptive. HPC has jetty for bringing in materials. We aren't proscriptive and as long as the site and carriers can show that the way they are doing it is secure and there are contingency measure in place then we can approve. We are stringent about that because of proximity to population.

2.15 *Comment:* We acknowledge the necessity to do all that you can to retain CNC staffing levels. The organisation works well and should be maintained.

*Response:* CNC seeks to retain its staff by providing enrichment in their work routine through expanding the places in which they operate.

### **3. Any other business**

There being no other business the Chair closed the meeting at 13.57.